

U-SMILE

Urban Smart Measures and Incentives for
quality of Life Enhancement

Erik T Verhoef, VU Amsterdam

Background

- Financial incentives for behavioural change
 - Pricing: efficient, effective, but low acceptability
 - Rewarding: popular, effective
 - But (1): Financially unsustainable (rewards!)
 - But (2): Less efficient (induced or latent demand problem)
 - Hybrid solutions?
 - **Budget neutral: e.g. tradable permits**

Project set-up

- 5 academic teams, multidisciplinary cooperation in all sub-projects

	1. VU	2. RUG	3. TUD-CET	4. TUD-TPM	5. HvA
Design	X	x	x	x	x ^a
Revealed behaviour of participants	X	x	x	x	x ^a
Effects in calibrated equilibrium models	x		X		
User acceptability	x	X		x	x
Stakeholder acceptability		x		X	x

^aLeading for ArenaA case

X means: involved in theme and leading

x means: involved in theme

Table 1 Thematic cooperation between subprojects

- 4 urban partners with own case studies
 - Verkeersonderneming Rotterdam
 - Amsterdam Zuidas
 - Groningen
 - Amsterdam Arena

What's hot?

- Lab-in-the-field experiment
 - Market in tradable permits functioned properly
 - Price path reflected equilibrium
 - Behaviour was in line with how tradable permits are intended
 - System functioned technically well

... and what's not?

- Kortere doorlooptijd HvA projecten
 - Lastiger om samenwerking tussen onderzoekspartners goed op te bouwen

Today

- Focus on collaboration with Verkeersonderneming Rotterdam
 - Why?
 - Logical given the timing of sub-projects: there are experiences to discuss
 - Interesting because it has multiple “sub-sub-projects”: Lab-in-the-field & On-the-road
 - Interesting because it is part of a more structural collaboration (Erik & Hans 2013)

Chewing

- How can we stimulate genuine “triple helix” collaborations?
 - Public bodies, private partners, academic partners
 - When is this really desirable / synergy?
 - How to maximize societal value added?
 - Which are the barriers to be removed (by whom?)
 - What can we learn from ongoing projects?